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THE COURTS AND CANON LAW
INTRODUCTION
For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical ac-
tions of a church judicatory are... 'arbitrary' must in-
herently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or
ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judica-
tory to follow.... But this is exactly the inquiry that the
First Amendment prohibits;... a civil court must accept
the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds
them.
If the civil courts are to be bound by any sheet of parch-
ment bearing the ecclesiastical seal and purporting to be
a decree of a church court, they can easily be converted
into handmaidens of arbitrary lawlessness. 2
What happens when courts encounter questions answerable by ca-
non law? In these quotations from Justice Brennan's majority opinion
and Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, the justices confront the difficulty of determining how
courts should handle disputes based on religious questions. Justice Bren-
nan concluded that courts cannot interfere with ecclesiastical law.
Courts must accept the decision of a church's highest judicatory. Justice
Rehnquist, however, maintained that the Illinois court which originally
heard the case had correctly applied the canon law of the church in the
court's attempt to resolve the question of who could control the Serbian
Diocese in America. Thus, from Rehnquist's perspective, the canonical
dispute merely required the Illinois court to recognize the correct choice
of law as canon law, and to apply it according to the Illinois court's
interpretation.
The point at which courts unconstitutionally trespass on a religion's
private domain in cases where they attempt to resolve non-intrachurch
religious disputes is not entirely clear from Serbian or any of the
Supreme Court's decisions in the past fifty years. Its decisions in in-
trachurch disputes suggest that courts should avoid settling issues ac-
cording to interpretations of church law or theology, but the Court has
never addressed the use of church law in disputes which go outside the
bounds of a church or religious community. When a party outside the
1 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).
2 Id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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church is involved in litigation with the church, courts cannot simply
defer to the judgments of the church, as Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion in Serbian advised.
This note discusses how courts should examine issues which seem
to depend upon the determination of the meaning of Roman Catholic
canon law. Courts confronted with canon law matters often contend that
they avoid the theological issues, and concentrate on the civil aspects of
a canon law definition. But it is questionable whether one can make such
a distinction within a doctrinal document. Moreover, public policy con-
siderations stemming from the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses
of the First Amendment should discourage courts from interpreting ca-
non law in any form. When courts interpret canon law, they violate the
Free Exercise clause by dictating to a religion what meaning the govern-
ment sanctions for their beliefs as codified in canon law. Furthermore,
courts violate the Establishment clause when they interpret canon law,
because the courts establish an official government position on the reli-
gious beliefs stated in the law.3
Historian Leonard Levy notes that the Establishment Clause serves
to "maintain civility between believers and unbelievers as well as among
the several hundred denominations, sects, and cults that thrive in our na-
tion."4 The framers of the Bill of Rights did not want to encourage dis-
putes over government support for the various churches among the states
with established churches, or disputes even among the various churches
for government support. Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray, writ-
ing in 1964, agreed with the proposition which Levy espouses. Murray
contended that the preservation of "the public peace" constitutes the most
important reason for the Establishment Clause.5 Thomas Jefferson iden-
tified another serious problem that could result from judicial interpreta-
tion of canon law, when he averred that government compulsion of
belief 6 would "corrupt the principles of that very religion it is meant to
encourage." 7 Although it is unlikely that a court's interpretation of ca-
non law would lead to the downfall of Catholic theology, the courts'
willingness to decide a church's doctrinal beliefs codified in "law" indi-
cates a lack of respect for the distinctiveness and value of religion and
for the importance of a church's self-determination.
3 Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
gives a lengthy definition of the meaning of the Establishment Clause. One aspect of the
meaning, he says, is that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa." Id. at 16.
4 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE Xiv (2d ed. 1994).
5 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 67 (1964).
6 Judicial interpretation of canon law represents a compulsion of belief, as it constitutes
a government ruling on what a church's doctrine means.
7 Quoted in WILLIAM L. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 60 (1986).
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Finally, any time a court concludes it can interpret canon law, one
should wonder whether the court's willingness to look into canon law
indicates the court's ignorance of the complexity of canon law. One
commentator has suggested that judicial interpretation of canon law is
analogous to an admiralty court hearing a products liability case.8
Nevertheless, courts have interpreted canon law. Non-intrachurch
disputes, which seem to require an interpretation of canon law, encom-
pass a much wider array of concerns than do intrachurch dispute cases.
I will look at the intersection of canon law and the secular courts in cases
involving questions of a bishop's vicarious liability for a priest's tortious
actions; ownership of a deceased monk's property when that monk has
taken a vow of poverty; necessity of payment of federal income taxes
when the priest or nun employee has taken a vow of poverty; ownership
of church property in an action for trespassing; and the secular legal va-
lidity of an antenuptial agreement requiring that a couple raise their chil-
dren Catholic. With the exception of the antenuptial agreement cases,
canon law issues in the courts generally concern agency law: Is the
priest the agent of the bishop? Is the monk or nun the agent of his reli-
gious order?9 Frequently courts turn to canon law to determine how the
Catholic Church defines these relationships. On other occasions, though,
courts eschew turning to canon law for the answer, and they concentrate
on the day-to-day realities of the relations between a priest and his
bishop or a member of a religious order and his or her order. 10
In general, the courts turn to canon law to answer these questions
because the parties themselves often define their relationships through
canon law. Thus, on a superficial level, looking to canon law to under-
stand how the Church explains these agency relationships sounds reason-
able. In a secular context, reference to an organization's internal rules in
order to define relationships within that organization would seem the
most rational means of understanding the legal relationships. Unlike
rules regulating relationships in a secular context, however, canon law
regulates these relationships within a context which defines religious be-
liefs. Any intrusion on these beliefs violates the Establishment and Free
Exercise clauses.
8 Bernard Roberts, Note, The Common Law Sovereignty ofReligious Lawfinders and
the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211, 228 (1991).
9 On agency relationships in religious organizations, see David Frohlich, Note, Will
Courts Make Change for a Large Denomination?: Problems of Interpretation in an Agency
Analysis in which a Religious Denomination is Involved in an Ascending Liability Tort Case,
72 IowA L. REv. 1377 (1987).
10 The dissent in Schuster v. Conissioner, 800 F.2d 672, 679 (1986), identified a work-
able means of determining the existence of an agency relationship between a member of a
religious community and the religious community. Infra text accompanying notes 125-34.
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Thus, courts should recognize the special position of religion in
American society, and not base their holdings on their interpretations of
church law. Even when church law apparently concerns only secular
issues, it is so intricately connected to doctrine that separation is actually
impossible. Moreover, the General Counsel of the U.S. Catholic Confer-
ence, Mark E. Chopko, has noted that "Church law cannot be interpreted
in the same way or by the same rules of construction as statutory law."11
I argue that courts may, however, rely on church law for certain eviden-
tiary purposes.
JUSTICE POWELL ON THE COURTS AND RELIGOUS LAW
Justice Powell's dissent in Jones v. Wolff2 represents the standard
by which courts should handle religious questions:
The neutral-principles approach 13 appears to assume that
the requirements of the Constitution will be satisfied if
civil courts are forbidden to consider certain types of ev-
idence. The First Amendment's Religion clauses, how-
ever, are meant to protect churches and their members
from civil law interference, not to protect the courts from
having to decide difficult evidentiary questions. 14
For the constitutionally necessary limitations are im-
posed not on the evidence to be considered but instead
on the object of the inquiry .... 15
As Jones v. Wolf involved an intrachurch property dispute, it is not di-
rectly relevant to the discussion of disputes between churches and secular
bodies. Still, one can extrapolate some of the principles of Jones v. Wolf
and apply them in the cases with which this paper will be concerned.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, argued that courts
should interpret the secular legal documents of a church according to the
civil effect which these documents would-have if they were viewed sim-
ply as secular documents.16 However, Justice Powell noted in his dissent
that Blackmun's approach could mean ignoring the actual intent of the
religious body so that if the ruling body of a church made a decision for
the church, a court might overturn it based on the court's interpretation
11 Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J.
oF TRIAL ADVOC. 289 (1993).
12 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
13 See infra Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), text accom-
panying notes 75-81.
14 443 U.S. at 613 n.2.
15 Id. at 620.
16 Id. at 606.
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of other documents with apparent civil effect.17 Powell also recognized
that "[a]ttempting to read them [constitutional documents of churches]
'in purely secular terms' is more likely to promote confusion than under-
standing."'18 In order to understand the secular meaning of church docu-
ments, courts may have to ignore or they may misread the religious
import of the documents. Powell maintained that the Court should ac-
cord as much deference as possible to the decision of churches.' 9 In the
cases of intrachurch property disputes, following Justice Blackmun's
stance could mean that a court would ignore the determination of the
church itself in order to accord certain documents full effect.20
I agree with Blackmun to the extent that he argues that documents,
such as contracts and articles of incorporation, offer the best means of
drawing conclusions about the civil legal effect of church positions in
disputes between churches and secular bodies, but this note differs with
Justice Blackmun's position to the extent that he could be understood to
advocate the civil legal interpretation of canon law. Although Blackmun
does assert that in cases such as intrachurch property disputes, he is pri-
marily concerned with the language creating a trust or other property
interest, if his position were taken to its logical conclusion, it could lead
to court interpretation of canon law.21 On the other hand, Justice Pow-
ell's acceptance of church documents for their evidentiary effect rather
17 Id. at 613.
18 Id. at 612.
19 Id. at 614.
20 The second step in Blackmun's analysis does provide that a court acquiesce in the
decision of the general church, if state law "provides that the identity of the... church is to be
determined according to the 'laws and regulations' of the" general church. Id. at 609. A state
could, then, fail to recognize the general church's authority if state law did not require such
recognition, and if church documents did not provide for general church authority in language
recognizable by civil courts. Powell identified a difficulty with this approach when he noted
that "[i]n the present case ... the general and unqualified authority of the Presbytery over the
actions of the Vineville church had not been expressed in secular terms of control of its prop-
erty. As a consequence, the Georgia courts could find no acceptable evidence of this authori-
tative relationship, and they imposed instead a congregational form of government determined
from state law." Id. at 613.
21 John H. Mansfield has remarked that the secular aspect of church documents is not as
distinguishable from the religious aspects as Justice Blackmun seems to believe. For example,
if one leaves a trust to the Roman Catholic Church in Chicago, questions may arise as to what
body is the Roman Catholic Church; or if one leaves a trust to the Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Chicago, a court may have to determine who is the Archbishop; or if one leaves the trust to
the body under the direction of the pope, a dispute may arise over who is the pope, as it did in
the case of the Avignon papacy in the fourteenth century. Symposium: The Religion Clauses
Article: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution
72 CAL. L. REv. 847, 866-67.
An additional problem with this allegedly secular approach involves the doctrinal deci-
sions which determine issues as minute as the hierarchical or congregational character of a
church, which, this note argues, is as far as courts may constitutionally go in making religious
determinations. Blackmun is clearly wrong in believing that any church documents can be
separated from church doctrine. The Watson court, which gave the greatest deference to
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than their dispositive effect reflects greater concern with acknowledging
the sovereignty of churches over their own affairs.
According to Powell's dissent, courts may accept canon law as evi-
dence, but they may not interpret it, nor may they identify it as their
object of inquiry.22 Moreover, in cases where a representative of the
Catholic Church supplies an interpretation of canon law, that interpreta-
tion is binding on the courts. Thus, any decision that concludes whether
canon law does or does not create an agency relationship impermissibly
intrudes on church decisions as to what correct doctrine is, and thus in-
trudes on the free exercise of religion. Analogously, when a civil court
upholds a religious antenuptial agreement, the court creates an establish-
ment of religion.
This argument will develop in 3 parts. Part I describes canon law,
and surveys the earliest associations between canon law and American
law. The final section of Part I discusses historical cases in which the
Supreme Court has turned to canon law for answers. Part II reviews
Supreme Court holdings on the review of religious statements primarily
in intrachurch disputes. This serves as a background for a discussion of
religious questions which arise outside the confines of a single church.
Finally, Part III considers cases in which courts have encountered ques-
tions answerable by canon law in cases extending beyond the bounds of a
single church. This final section will assert that courts can always an-
swer these questions more easily and more fairly by examining non-ca-
nonical evidence. Most importantly, by avoiding the canonical
questions, courts will avoid free exercise and establishment concerns.
I. AMERICAN LAW AND CANON LAW
As a preface to the examination of how courts in the twentieth cen-
tury have handled and how they should handle questions answerable by
canon law, this section will first cursorily describe canon law, in addition
to church constitutions, contracts, and religious corporate charters. The
second section of Part One discusses some common ground between ca-
non law and American law. And the third section looks at a few histori-
cal cases in which the Supreme Court has found it necessary to turn to
canon law.
A. CANON LAW
Unlike church constitutions, charters, and contracts, canon law is
unmistakably theological in all its aspects. It represents the codification
churches, left the determination of how to act on the structure of church government. See
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
22 443 U.S. at 620.
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of church theology into canonical or legal language.23 Pope John Paul II
noted in his Apostolic Constitution Sacrae Disciplinae Leges that the
promulgation of the 1983 version of the Code "is an expression of pontif-
ical authority and therefore is invested with a primatial character,"2 4
which nevertheless also reflects the pope's collegiality with his fellow
bishops around the world. Furthermore, the Pope indicates that canon
law has developed from Old and New Testament Law.25
The 1983 version of the Code of Canon Law derives from revisions
described in the conciliar26 documents of Vatican I. John Alesandro
asserts that the contents of the Code do not constitute "statutes or laws
but exhortative or theological statements more properly classified as 'a-
juridic."' 2 7 Additionally, Alesandro maintains that in order to interpret
canon law, one must understand Catholic theology, as well as the signifi-
cant differences between canon law and American law.28 Nevertheless,
Alesandro fails to make an important distinction between canon law,
church constitutions, and contract.
Carl Zollman, in his classic but dated treatise on American civil
church law, does draw a distinction between the functions of church con-
stitutions and contracts, as opposed to canon law.29 He says that gener-
ally where a church is incorporated under state law "its charter, or the
law under which the incorporation has been effected, is its constitution,
while any other document, no matter what name may be applied to it, is
but at most a by-law which must be consistent with the constitution in
order to be valid." °30 Church constitutions for unincorporated bodies, he
says, signify more than just statements from the highest body in the
church; that is, a constitution is more than just a high level ecclesiastical
legislative act. A constitution describes how the religious body agrees to
govern itself, and this description will usually require more than an inter-
nal legislative act to bring about change. However, longstanding com-
mon practice may also develop constitutional meaning within a church.31
23 Ionnes Paulus PP. II [Pope John Paul I], Apostolic Constitution Sacrae Disciplinae
Leges, in THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMNTARY XXV (James A. Coriden et al.
eds., 1985). "Canonical language" in this case means that the theology is expressed as law.
24 Id. By "primatial character," the Pope is referring to his character as pope, or primate.
25 Ionnes Paulus PP. II, supra note 23, at xxv.
26 "Conciliar" is an adjective referring to a "council," such as Vatican II.
27 John Alesandro, General Introduction, in TiE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 23, at
11.
28 Id. at 12-13.
29 CARL ZourMAN, Amwc.AN CIVIL CHURCH LAW (1917). Apparently, no book since
Zollman has treated church law as well, if at all. Still, Zollman's work suffers from more than
its antiquated nature. Zollman concentrates more on American Protestant church law than on
American church law in general, as Roman Catholics and Jews receive little attention.
30 Id. at 140.
31 Id. at 140-41.
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The entire Roman Catholic Church is not an incorporated body in
the United States; individual bishops overseeing their dioceses are either
corporations sole,32 legally autonomous of each other and the Holy
See,33 or the dioceses themselves, rather than the bishops, are religious
corporations. 34 Thus, the charters of the individual bishops as corpora-
tions sole and the charters of the dioceses as religious corporations can
and do qualify as constitutions open to judicial interpretation. Canon
law, on the other hand, does not fit well under Zollman's definition of
church constitutions. The Code represents high level ecclesiastical
church legislation, which includes the "Hierarchical Constitution of the
Church, ' '35 a delineation of the nature and structure of the Roman Catho-
lic church, including a definition of the government of Vatican City,
which is a sovereign nation capable of sending and receiving diplomats.
Accordingly, the Code defines a government capable of forming treaties
with the United States, but the Code does not embody a description of a
form of church government open to judicial interpretation.
Contract is another area open to judicial intervention. Zollman
notes that "It]here can be no question but that the relation, of a member
to the society, so far as it can be regulated by the courts must rest on
contract. '' 36 He indicates that this relationship has special significance in
cases of communal religious societies, such as the Oneida Community,37
as well as in cases of vows of poverty to religious communities, such as
orders of priests, monks, and nuns. 38 Of course, churches may also con-
tract with businesses for services. In the case of Roman Catholicism,
then, contract and canon law intersect primarily in cases concerning
property ownership or taxation of members of religious communities re-
quiring vows of poverty.39 However, as I note in Part III, in none of
these cases must the court reach its determination in terms of canon law.
Courts should not have to turn to canon law, as long as secular doc-
uments, such as constitutions and contracts, are available for judicial in-
terpretation. Use of the latter prevents the free exercise and
32 A corporation sole is a corporation composed of only one person, the bishop. When
the bishop dies a new person, the new bishop, takes over as the corporation.
33 The Holy See is the body which governs the geographical area known as Vatican City.
It also governs the Roman Catholic Church more generally.
34 Massachusetts law, for example, constitutes bishops as corporations sole, while New
York religious incorporation law provides for the incorporation of the entire diocese. See
LEGAL DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC WELFARE CONFERENCE, MODE OF TENURE:
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 8, 9 (n.d.), and 30, 40 (Supp.
1954). See also N.Y. RELIO. CORP. LAW §§ 91 and 92 (McKinney 1990).
35 1983 CODE cc. 330-572.
36 ZoLLMAN, supra note 29, at 313.
37 Burt v. Oneida Community, 137 N.Y. 346 (1893).
38 ZOLLMAN, supra note 29, at 315.
39 Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, 234 U.S. 640 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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establishment problems which occur when courts examine canon law; it
also provides courts with the most accessible and easily understood doc-
uments for determining church-related secular problems.
B. AMERICAN LAW AND CANON LAW
Despite the problems which arise when courts attempt to interpret
canon law, American law does share some principles with canon law,
inasmuch as American law derives to a certain extent from canon law.
Harold Berman affirms that all modem Western law derives from the
codification of canon law in the eleventh and twelfth centuries: 40
[A]ll the national revolutions since the sixteenth cen-
tury-except the American-were directed in part
against the Roman Catholic Church or, in Russia, the
Orthodox Church, and all of them transferred large por-
tions of the transnational canon law from the church to
the national state.41
Despite Berman's exception of the American revolution from his assem-
bly of anti-church revolutions, America did like other revolutionary
countries derive its law from canon law, since American law comes from
England, which Berman does include among these national revolutions. 42
Additionally, Berman argues that canon law even forms the basis of
some modem secular law. He notes that "[p]rior to the sixteenth cen-
tury," ecclesiastical courts in England, "which had a wide jurisdiction
over contract disputes involving not only clerics but also laymen, applied
the canon law of the Roman Church."'43 Moreover, he relates that during
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, civil contracts often contained provi-
sions that, in case a dispute develops over the contract, the contract con-
flict should go before an ecclesiastic court rather than a secular court,
"[b]ecause of the primitive character of most secular procedure."44
Berman describes the significant development of English contract law
40 Berman asserts that canon law resulted from two eleventh century developments: first,
in response to the Investiture Crisis of 1075-1122 in which Pope Gregory VII asserted supreme
authority over secular rulers; and second the discovery of Justinian law. HAROLD J. BERMAN,
FArT AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 39, 42, 267-68 (1993) [here-
inafter BERMAN, FArrIH AND ORDER]; and BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THm FORMATION
OF THE WEsTERN LEaA TRAnON 2-4, 204 (1983) [hereinafter BmVAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION].
41 BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER, supra note 40, at 29, and BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLU-
TION, supra note 40, at 24.
42 BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 40, at 24. See also Alesandro, supra
note 27, at 11, where Alesandro asserts that "[c]anon law has had its own impact on civil law.
This can be seen in both the legal systems of continental Europe and the common law
tradition."
43 BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER, supra note 40, at 196.
44 BEMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 40, at 223.
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after England's break with Rome, but he says that the canon law under-
standing of contract continued to inform English law, despite the addi-
tion of Puritan understandings of the covenant to legal conceptions of
contract. 45 Finally, he indicates that American laws on trusts and es-
tates,4 6 corporations, 47 and marriage4 8 continue to show signs in the
twentieth century of their canon law backgrounds.
Meanwhile, Alesandro emphasizes that canon law is thoroughly
grounded in theology.49 This theological grounding, however, served
both secular and ecclesiastical needs in medieval Europe. Although the
European nations created two distinct secular and ecclesiastical jurisdic-
tions, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was so encompassing that all issues in-
volving clergy and concerns of the church came under its jurisdiction.
Many of the issues involving clergy, as well as many of the concerns of
the church, including inheritance, property, contract "(on the foundation
of pledges of faith), and criminal and tort law (on the foundation of juris-
diction over sins)"50 would strike modem Americans as secular issues.
C. THE SUPREME COURT'S CANON LAW DECISIONS
The extensiveness of European ecclesiastical jurisdiction provided
the basis for canonical influence on the only canon law cases to reach the
Supreme Court. These cases reached American courts as a result of
American conquests of Spanish North America colonies. Two of the
cases involved questions of the legitimacy of marriages and the place of
the ecclesiastical courts in determining such a question, and one of the
cases involved the problem of ownership of church land. Despite the
applicability of ecclesiastical law to these issues, the Supreme Court did
not base its holdings on canon law. In fact, it concentrated on the evi-
dentiary value of canon law, rather than on interpretations of canon law,
which accords with Powell's perspective in his dissent in Jones v. Wolf.51
One could easily argue, nonetheless, that Powell's caution on the use of
church law applies less forcefully in these cases in which ecclesiastical
law served a secular purpose. In the cases of the former Spanish North
American colonies, the Supreme Court did not avoid canon law from fear
of creating a First Amendment entanglement, since canon law would
have provided a reasonable secular legal basis for decisions based on
conflicts of law. The Court's adherence to such a standard even under
45 BERmAN, FArrH AND ORDER, supra note 40, at 196-205.
46 BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, supra note 40, at 234-36.
47 Id. at 239.
48 Id. at 227.
49 Alesandro, supra note 27, at 11.
50 B~muAN, LAW AND REVOLUrION, supra note 40, at 223.
51 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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these conditions, however, speaks still more forcefully in favor of Pow-
ell's position.
The first of these cases, Hallett v. Collins,5 2 concerned ownership of
a plot of land in Alabama. In order to decide that question, though, the
Supreme Court had to determine the legitimacy of a marriage entered
into when Alabama was under Spanish rule. Spanish law granted juris-
diction over marriage to the ecclesiastical courts. Thus, the Supreme
Court referred to the statement by the Council of Trent 53 that "marriage
not celebrated before the parish or other priest, or by license of the ordi-
nary [bishop] and before two or three witnesses" was invalid.54 Thus,
the Court considered whether a marriage contracted in Alabama under
Spanish rule was valid, despite the absence of a priest at the marriage.
The Court noted that the King of Spain did not extend this Tridentine
ruling to the Spanish colonies, and consequently, that "general law of
Europe antecedent to the council" remained in effect in the colonies. 55
Hence, despite the absence of a priest, the marriage was valid.
Ten years later, Gaines v. Hennen56 came to the Supreme Court
from New Orleans; it involved several inheritance questions which sepa-
rately reached the Supreme Court six times.57 The sixth time the case
reached the Court, it considered the question of Mrs. Myra Gaines' legit-
imacy. Before Mrs. Gaines' mother, Zulime, had married Mrs. Gaines'
father, Daniel Clark, Zulime had been married to Jerome Des' Grange,
who was believed to be a bigamist. If Mr. Des Grange were a bigamist,
then his marriage to Zulime was invalid; the marriage between the Clarks
would be valid; and Mrs. Gaines would be legitimate. But if Mr. Des
Grange was not a bigamist, then his marriage to Zulime would be valid;
Zulime's marriage to Daniel Clark would be invalid; and Mrs. Gaines'
would be illegitimate. In a lower court proceeding, evidence was
presented that an ecclesiastical court in New Orleans (then under Spanish
colonial rule) had found Mr. Des Grange guilty of bigamy. Thus, the
Supreme Court considered at great length the validity of such an ecclesi-
astical conclusion under applicable Spanish law and canon law. After
considering the then recent history of the interrelationship between canon
law and Spanish secular law, the Supreme Court concluded that Spain
52 51 U.S. (10 How.) 174 (1850).
53 The Catholic Church defined its doctrine in response to the theological challenges of
the Protestant Reformation with the Council of Trent (1543-65). The adjective referring to the
Council of Trent is "Tridentine."
54 51 U.S. at 181.
55 Id. at 182.
56 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553 (1860).
57 The Court noted that "[w]hen hereafter some distinguished American lawyer shall
,retire from his practice to write the history of his country's jurisprudence, this case will be
registered by him as the most remarkable in the records of the court." Id. at 615.
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had restrained ecclesiastical courts from making decisions regarding po-
lygamous marriages, and thus that the church court's determination of
Mr. Des Grange's bigamy could not be considered a binding legal
determination. 58
The third Supreme Court case touching on canon law entailed a less
involved examination of canon law. Beard v. Federy59 involved the
ownership of church land which had been under Mexican rule before the
Mexican-American War. The plaintiffs asserted that Governor Pio Pico
had granted them the land, while Bishop Alemany of Monterey con-
tended that the land belonged to the church which had held it for fifty
years. However, the church held no deed to the land. The issue was,
thus, whether Mexican law allowed the church to use the land without
granting ownership to the church, or whether Mexican law simply did
not require the church to hold a deed for the land. The Court noted that:
the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church was in
force as the law of Mexico, as it had been previously of
Spain when Mexico was a dependency thereof, in all
things relating to the acquisition, transmission, use, and
disposition of property, real and personal, belonging to
the church or devoted to religious uses; that by the laws
of Spain and Mexico, it was not necessary that a grant of
land for ecclesiastical or church purposes should appear
by deed or writing, public or private, but that the right of
the church to such property was always recognized as
regulated by canon law .... 60
Accordingly, the court recognized canon law as the applicable decisional
law. Nevertheless, the court held without discussing canon law that,
since the church had previously requested from the United States timely
recognition of the church's ownership of the land under Mexican law, the
question of the ownership of the land had already been conclusively de-
cided in the church's favor.61
Additionally, in two twentieth century cases, the Supreme Court
recognized the validity of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 by which the
United States agreed to continue to recognize Spanish law regarding the
Catholic Church in the insular possessions, such as Puerto Rico and the
Phillippines. In Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church In Porto
Rico,62 a property dispute between the Catholic Church and the city of
Ponce, the Court did not directly face a question of applicability of canon
58 Id. at 587.
59 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478 (1865).
60 Id. at 488.
61 Id. at 490-91.
62 210 U.S. 296 (1908).
[Vol. 6:171
CANON LAW
law. However, it did face the problem of transfer of ecclesiastical prop-
erty from a government recognizing a union of church and state to a
government "prevented from having such associations with any
church. ' 63 The Court held that, given the Treaty and the change in the
government, the Catholic Church was entitled to keep land which the city
of Ponce claimed for itself.64
This recognition of the character of the Treaty served as precedent
in a case in which the Supreme Court relied on canon law probably more
heavily than any other. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ma-
nila65 involved a question of the validity of the inheritance of a chap-
laincy by a boy who did not meet the legal canonical age and educational
requirements. The Court accepted the archbishop's interpretation of ca-
non law, which prevented the boy from receiving the chaplaincy, and the
Court deferred to the Church's prerogative to make its own determina-
tions of correct doctrine. 66 This deference to churches in their doctrinal
determinations is developed further in Part II of the paper. What makes
Gonzalez different from the previous cases, and different from the canon
law cases in Part mII is that Gonzalez and the cases in Part II all involve
questions of intrachurch disputes. The Supreme Court has not explicitly
defined how courts should deal with questions of canon law when these
questions do not involve intrachurch disputes or conflict of laws ques-
tions stemming from the annexation of Spanish colonies.
In the cases concerning canon law which have come before the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has not avoided canon law, and has
recognized its applicability. However, the Court reached holdings in
these cases which allowed canon law as evidence, 67 but which did not
involve interpretations of canon law. Although the Court has not prohib-
ited considerations of canon law in cases more intimately touching on
church matters, the failure of the Court to interpret canon law, even in
these cases, makes questionable lower courts' efforts to interpret canon
law. This dubious applicability of canon law becomes more evident
63 Id. at 322.
64 Id. at 318.
65 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
66 Id. at 17.
67 The Supreme Court has also discussed canon law in some secular cases. In Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), Justice Blackmun, in summarizing the legal history of abortion,
noted the position of canon law on abortion, and the fact that in England, abortion originally
came under the heading of an ecclesiastical or canon law crime. Id. at 133, 134, 136. The
Court has also made use of canon law as historical background in property cases. See, e.g.,
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68 (1972). Finally, in Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Rutledge, dissenting from the Court's decision to
allow municipally-funded bus transportation for Catholic school children, quoted from canon
law to argue that the Catholic Church regards Catholic school education as a thoroughly reli-
gious enterprise. Id. at 22.
1996]
184 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
from the Court's holdings in cases of intrachurch disputes, discussed in
the next part.
II. DOCTRINAL QUESTIONS AND THE COURTS
This section covers the progression of Supreme Court jurisprudence
in intrachurch property disputes. Intrachurch property disputes, which
have reached the Supreme Court, have led to a substantial body of law on
how courts should handle church property disputes between members of
a church who have separated because of doctrinal differences. These dis-
putes give us some idea of how the Court believes lower courts should
handle questions answerable by church law or church doctrine. Thus,
they serve as background for Part III's discussion of how courts should
handle doctrinal or canonical questions which arise outside the bounds of
a single church.
The Court's policy on these disputes has become complex, since the
first intrachurch dispute it heard in Watson v. Jones68 in 1872. Jones v.
Wolf appears last in this section, and represents the complication of the
Court's simple principle for dealing with these disputes first enunciated
in Watson v. Jones. Each of these cases presents the problem of how far
the courts can go in resolving religious property disputes without inter-
fering with religious freedom.
In Watson the Supreme Court defined for the first time how courts
should handle intrachurch disputes. In 1865, the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church decreed that any Southerner seeking to become
a missionary, a member, or a minister of a Presbyterian church who had
maintained during the War that slavery was a divine institution "should
be required to repent and forsake these sins before they could be re-
ceived." 69 When the Walnut Street Church divided over this issue; one
side joined the General Assembly of the Confederate States, while the
other remained with the General Assembly of the United States. These
two groups then began a dispute over the ownership of the land.
In deciding this case, the Court made a distinction between forms of
church government, which, the Court said, would determine the stance a
court should take with internal church disputes. With hierarchical
churches, such as the Presbyterian church-and the Roman Catholic
Church in Gonzalez, courts must accept the judgment of the highest
church body which has given a judgment in the case. However, with
congregational or independent churches, such as Baptist and Pentecostal-
ist churches, courts must accept either the judgment of the majority
within the church, or whatever other means the church has provided for
68 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
69 Id. at 691.
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settling disputes. In either case, courts must not substitute their own be-
liefs and judgments for the churches' judgments. In the case of both
kinds of church polities, the members of the churches had joined the
churches recognizing that the church would resolve its disputes, accord-
ing to its internal form of government.70
The Court refined its position for dealing with intrachurch disputes
in five subsequent cases. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedrapl resulted
from the New York State legislature's resolution to remove the Moscow
patriarch from control over the Russian Orthodox New York cathedral,
in order to grant control of the cathedral to an archbishop elected by the
American Russian Orthodox community. The New York legislature be-
lieved that it was acting for reasonable political reasons, since it was
attempting to avoid the Soviet-influenced patriarch from exercising con-
trol over property in New York.72 The Supreme Court, however, viewed
this as an intrachurch property dispute analogous to Watson:
[T]he authority of courts is in strict subordination to the
ecclesiastical law of a particular church prior to schism
.... This very limited right of resort to courts for deter-
mination of claims, civil in their nature, between rival
parties among the communicants of a religious faith is
merely one aspect of the duty of courts to enforce the
rights of members in an association, temporal or reli-
gious, according to the laws of the association. 73
Although this holding accords with the Watson reasoning, as well as the
Gonzalez holding, that the will of the highest authority of a hierarchical
church-here the Moscow patriarch-is binding on the' courts, the
Kedroff court went further by applying the Free Exercise Clause to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time.74
70 Watson was not decided on First Amendment grounds, nor was it decided based on
Kentucky law (the location of the church). Watson preceded an application of the First
Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court incorpo-
rated the Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment in 1952 in Kedroff v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); and it incorporated the Establishment Clause in 1947
with Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Watson also preceded Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which would have
required the Court to apply Kentucky law in this case. The Court based its holding on federal
common law, or "general rules as to the limited role which civil courts must have in settling
private intraorganizational disputes." For a discussion of this, see Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (976).
71 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
72 344 U.S. at 108.
73 Id. at 122.
74 Id. at 107.
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In 1969, in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,75 the Court articulated its
"neutral principles of law" formula for dealing with intrachurch disputes.
The facts in Presbyterian Church resemble those in Watson. A Presbyte-
rian church in Georgia split into one minority faction which supported
the General Assembly under which the church had originally functioned,
and one majority faction which wanted to follow another General As-
sembly. Like Watson, this case developed as a dispute between two fac-
tions, but unlike Watson, Presbyterian Church resulted from the original
General Assembly suing the majority faction for the use of the church.
By contrast, in Watson, the dispute never went beyond the congregation.
More significantly, this case differs from Watson, because of Georgia's
statutory effort to decide intrachurch disputes. At the time the Presbyte-
rian Church dispute arose, Georgia law "implie[d] a trust of local
church property for the benefit of the general church on the sole condi-
tion that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice ex-
isting at the time of affiliation by the local churches. '76
The Supreme Court struck down the Georgia rule, and held that a
determination whether a general church continues to adhere to the origi-
nal tenets "existing at the time of affiliation," would involve an imper-
missible intrusion into a church's determination of its own doctrine.77 A
court cannot really say whether a doctrine is in substance the same or
different. Georgia may decide property disputes solely on the basis of
what the Court called "neutral principles of law."'78 Justice Brennan ex-
plained that this principle requires that "[s]tates, religious organizations,
and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so
as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions. '79
This principle clearly prohibits secular determination of ecclesiastical
questions whether the questions turn on internal property disputes or not,
as Justice Brennan also noted that "[s]pecial problems arise . . . when
these disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and prac-
tice."80 The Court ignored the fact that churches are unlikely to split
over anything but questions of "church doctrine and practice." Thus, the
neutral principles approach was bound to create difficulty in its
application.
75 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
76 Id. at 443.
77 Id. at 449.
78 Id. at 448.
79 id. at 449.
80 Id. at 445. One year after Presbyterian Church, Justice Brennan reiterated his position
against court interference in any doctrinal questions in his concurrence to the denial of certio-
rari in Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God of Sharps-
burg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Nevertheless, in reaching its holding, the Court did reiterate in dicta
a principle from Gonzalez which has never achieved acceptance:
In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the
decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights are
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclu-
sive, because the parties in interest made them so by
contract or otherwise.81
However, the Court indicated in United State v. Ballard82 that courts face
possibly insurmountable difficulties if they try to determine whether a
religious activity constitutes fraud. To do so may involve placing the
truth of a religion before a jury. Hence, the most that a court can do is to
determine whether a belief is sincerely held.
One year later, the Court dismissed an appeal in Maryland and Vir-
ginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg
for lack of a substantial federal question, as the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals had avoided a religious question and decided the issue based on
state law.83 In a concurrence to the dismissal of the appeal, Justice Bren-
nan stated that religious freedom could be inhibited if "church property
litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice."84 Additionally, he asserted that:
Under Watson civil courts do not inquire whether the
relevant church governing body has power under reli-
gious law to control the property in question. Such a
determination, unlike the identification of the governing
body, frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambig-
uous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to
probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within
a church so as to decide where religious law places con-
trol over the use of church property would violate the
First Amendment in much the same manner as civil de-
terminations of religious doctrine. Similarly, where the
identity of the governing body or bodies that exercise
general authority within a church is a matter of substan-
tial controversy, civil courts are not to make the inquiry
into religious law and usage that would be essential to
the resolution of the controversy. In other words, the use
of the Watson approach is consonant with the prohibi-
81 Id. at 447 (quoting Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16).
82 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
83 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
84 Id. at 368. Justices Douglas and Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's concurrence.
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tions of the First Amendment only if the appropriate
church governing body can be determined without the
resolution of doctrinal questions and without extensive
inquiry into religious polity. 85
Thus, in 1970 four justices denied that a civil court could make any de-
terminations requiring reference to church law.
In 1976, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich86 fol-
lowed Presbyterian Church in the line of Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning intrachurch disputes. Like Kedroff, this case concerned a dispute
over diocesan control in an Eastern Orthodox denomination. After the
Holy Synod of the Church removed and defrocked Bishop Dionisije
Milivojevich, it replaced him with Bishop Firmilian Ocokoijich. The
Holy Synod then split the diocese into three dioceses. Dionisije sued to
have himself declared bishop of the undivided diocese. The Supreme
Court of Illinois "held that the proceedings of the Mother Church re-
specting Dionisije were procedurally and substantively defective under
the internal regulations of the Mother Church and were therefore arbi-
trary and invalid. '87 The Supreme Court held invalid both this determi-
nation and the Illinois court's conclusion that the diocese could not be
split. Justice Brennan writing for the majority argued that
[T]he Illinois Supreme Court relied on purported 'neu-
tral principles' for resolving property disputes which
would 'not in any way entangle this court in the
determination of theological or doctrinal mat-
ters.' ... Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Illinois sub-
stituted its interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother
Church constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunals in which church law vests authority to make
this interpretation. This the First and Fourteenth
Amendments forbid. [Citations omitted.]
We will not delve into the various church constitutional
provisions relevant to this conclusion, for that would re-
peat the error of the Illinois Supreme Court.88
Whether corporate bylaws or other documents governing
the individual property-holding corporations may affect
any desired disposition of the Diocesan property is a
question not before us. 89
85 Id. at 368.
86 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
87 Id. at 697.
88 Id. at 721.
89 Id. at 724.
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Justice Rehnquist in his dissent foresaw what it would mean for such a
question to come up, as it did later in Jones. He commented that "the
Illinois courts sought to answer [the question presented by both respon-
dents and petitioner] by application of the canon law of the church, just
as they would have attempted to decide a similar dispute among the
members of any voluntary association." 90 Rehnquist viewed this as inev-
itable "[u]nless civil courts are to be wholly divested of authority to re-
solve conflicting claims to real property owned by a hierarchical
church." 91 He noted further that "[s]uch reasons will obviously be based
on the canon law by which the disputants have agreed to bind them-
selves, but they also must represent a preference for one view of that law
over another."' 92 Thus, he believed the Court should ignore Watson and
permit courts to interpret church law. Rehnquist argued that Watson
could not serve as precedent for interpreting the First Amendment, since
Watson was decided according to federal common law prior to Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins.93 Still, Rehnquist was dissenting. The majority
did not overrule Watson.
Jones v. Wolff4 in 1979 was the last of the intrachurch property
disputes. Rather than making the Court's earlier position clearer, Jones
complicated the Court's stance on the correct attitude which civil courts
should take when confronted with religious questions. Like Presbyterian
Church, Jones concerned the application of Georgia law to an in-
trachurch property dispute. This time the dispute arose as a result of a
schism within the church. A majority of the Vineville Presbyterian
Church of Macon, Georgia voted to separate from the presbyterian polity
known as the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The presbytery
of the PCUS under which the church had been governed concluded that
the minority who remained loyal to the PCUS "constituted the true con-
gregation of Vineville Presbyterian Church." 95 The minority then
brought suit to remove the majority from the church property. The Geor-
gia court found in favor of the majority, after applying what it believed to
be "neutral principles."
When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun
framed the issue as a question "whether civil courts, consistent with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the
dispute on the basis of 'neutral principles of law,' or whether they must
defer to' the resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical
90 Id at 726.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 726-27.
93 Id. at 727.
94 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
95 Id. at 598.
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church."'96 He concluded that neutral principles of law are an acceptable
means of resolving a property dispute in cases where documents indicate
that the property is held in trust for the general church. 97 If it is not, then
the property will remain with the local church. But in cases of a schism,
as in this case, the court will either allow a presumption in favor of the
majority; or in cases where determining the correct identity of the con-
trolling group in the local church requires an understanding of religious
doctrine, the court will decide in favor of the decision of the larger ruling
body of the church, which in this case is the presbytery which granted the
church property to the minority.
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that "the First Amendment prohib-
its civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of
religious doctrine and practice. '98 Moreover, in expanding upon this, he
quoted Justice Brennan's concurrence in Maryland & Virginia Churches
for the proposition that the Court could adopt "one of various ap-
proaches.., so long as it involved no consideration of doctrinal matters
whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith."99 Black-
mun used this assertion to conclude that courts could examine religious
documents, as long as the examination would not place the courts in a
position to "resolve a religious controversy."' 00 Unfortunately, such a
conclusion misses the point that Justice Brennan was making. His full
statement, which Blackmun omits, makes this clear:
Under Watson civil courts do not inquire whether the
relevant church governing body has power under reli-
gious law to control the property in question. Such a
determination, unlike the determination of the governing
body, frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambig-
uous law and usage. To permit civil courts to probe
deeply enough into the allocation of power within a
church so as to decide where religious law places control
over the use of church property would violate the First
Amendment in much the same manner as civil law deter-
minations of religious doctrine. 101
Thus, the full quotation from which Blackmun cites actually contradicts
his position. According to Brennan, courts cannot even examine church
doctrine to determine who rules the church. Blackmun ignored the fact
96 Id. at 597.
97 Id. at 603.
98 Id. at 602.
99 Id. (quoting Brennan, J., concurring in Maryland & Virginia Churches, 396 U.S. at
368.)
100 Id. at 604.
101 396 U.S. at 368.
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that no question regarding a church's polity can avoid "consideration of
doctrinal matters."10 2 Admittedly, Justice Blackmun recognized that
In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must
take special care to scrutinize the document in purely
secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in
determining whether the document indicates that the par-
ties have intended to create a trust. ... If in such a case
the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would
require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy,
then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctri-
nal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body. 10 3
This position overlooks the connection between doctrine and religious
law.
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun contended that Justice Powell in
dissent did not avoid this problem, as Justice Powell's approach would
require a court to examine the documents of a church to determine
whether its polity is congregational or hierarchical. Clearly, Powell's
approach would involve much less of an inquiry into a religion's docu-
ments than would Justice Blackmun's approach. Additionally, the form
of polity may be determined from the manner in which the denomination
actually conducts its affairs between congregations within the denomina-
tion. 10 4 Finally, although Justice Blackmun's approach appears to give
deference to the church, his willingness to allow the courts to examine
church documents at all provides too much opportunity for intrusion into
a church's doctrine as expressed in its law.
102 See supra, discussion of Presbyterian Church v. Blue Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969), text accompanying notes 75-81.
103 443 U.S. at 604.
104 Frohlich, supra note 9, overstates the matter and he provides no support for his as-
sumptions, when he asserts:
The three principal categories of polity are congregational, hierarchical, and presby-
terial. Watson reduced these to two, placing the presbyterial-form within the hierar-
chical category. The actual multiplicity of forms and the cryptic nature of much
ecclesiastical law have presented analytical problems for courts. These problems
have been compounded by the simplified dichotomy of Watson's categories.
Id. at 1381-82. The dichotomy is reasonable. Although a presbyterian polity shares character-
istics of both congregational and hierarchical churches, presbyterian churches are in fact essen-
tially hierarchical. This categorization is by no means an oversimplification. In fact, the
"cryptic nature of much of ecclesiastical law," is exactly why courts should avoid interpreting
it. Much of Frohlich's note concerns a discussion of how courts can interpret religious docu-
ments reasonably. I contend that any judicial interpretation of a religious document is unrea-
sonable. See also Mark E. Chopko, supra note 11, at 346, who, citing Frohlich, notes that
"Church law cannot be interpreted in the same way or by the same rules of construction as
statutory law."
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Justice Powell recognized the problems with Justice Blackmun's ap-
proach. As noted in the Introduction, Powell acknowledges that Justice
Blackmun's two-step evidentiary approach denies:
to the courts relevant evidence as to the religious pol-
ity-that is, the form of governance-adopted by the
church members. The constitutional documents of
churches tend to be drawn in terms of religious precepts.
Attempting to read them 'in purely secular terms' is
more likely to promote confusion than understanding.
Moreover, whenever religious polity has not been ex-
pressed in specific statements referring to the property of
a church, there will be no evidence cognizable under the
neutral-principles rule. Lacking such evidence, presum-
ably a court will impose some rule of church govern-
ment derived from state law.' 05
Powell notes further that the First Amendment is not meant as a rule to
exclude certain forms of evidence, but as a rule to avoid interference in
religious affairs. 10 6 Thus, he remains loyal to Watson.
Jones has left the Court's position on judicial interpretation of ca-
non law confused. Justice Blackmun's position does not necessarily dis-
allow turning to canon law, since many of the canons appear as secular
statements not doctrinal statements. Faced with the difficulty of win-
nowing out a secular statement from a religious document, lower courts
really have no clear guidance on how to handle difficult intrachurch dis-
putes. The Supreme Court has not plainly delineated the extent to which
courts may examine and interpret church documents. Justice Powell's
position probably expresses most accurately the stance which the Court
should have taken based on its precedent. Church law is off limits to
courts. Any interpretation of church law constitutes an intrusion into the
freedom of the church.
In the following section, the paper will review the ways in which
courts encounter questions apparently answerable by canon law. Consis-
tent with Justic Powell's dissent, I will argue that courts should avoid the
canon law question, and use canon law not as an object of inquiry, but as
an evidentiary source for understanding the context of the question. Jus-
tice Powell dissent would require deference and respect for the distinc-
tiveness of the religious statement, and, I believe, would recognize the
value of turning only to secular statements and actions in secular contro-
versies with religious bodies.
105 Id. at 612.
106 Id. at 613 n.2.
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Im. CANON LAW AND THE COURTS
Questions of canon law can reach the courts in numerous ways.
The cases which follow involve questions such as ownership of a de-
ceased monk's property when that monk has taken a vow of poverty; a
bishop's vicarious liability for a priest's tortious actions; necessity of
payment of federal income taxes when the priest or nun employee has
taken a vow of poverty; ownership of church property in an action for
trespassing; and the secular legal validity of an antenuptial agreement
requiring that a couple raise their children Catholic. As noted in the
introduction, these questions frequently involve agency questions: Is the
priest or the member of the religious order the agent of the bishop or the
head of the religious order; or is the priest or the member of the religious
order merely acting for himself? In the course of reviewing these cases,
this section argues that courts act correctly when they refuse to resolve
these questions by reference to canon law. In each of these cases the
agency relationship is ascertainable by examination of the daily affairs of
the priest or member of the religious order. 107 Generally, in cases in
which courts answer the agency question by interpreting canon law,
courts intrude on the free exercise of religion by defining the govern-
ment's position on a theological statement. When this section discusses
civil courts and religious antenuptia, agreements, it argues that civil en-
forcement results in an establishment of religion.
The Supreme Court has never confronted directly the problem of
questions answerable by canon law. The closest it has come to such a
problem arose in 1914 in Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser'08 in
which the Court happily concluded that it would not have to examine the
issue according to the canon law description of religious community life.
In reality, though, the Court did need to refer to religious law in order to
come to a decision. The case involved ownership of royalties from books
written by a monk in the Order of St. Benedict. In 1852, Father Augustin
Wirth joined the Order of St. Benedict, a Roman Catholic order founded
by St. Benedict in sixth century Italy. As a normal part of entry into the
Order, Father Wirth took vows of obedience, stability, chastity and pov-
erty. Father Wirth, who lived for awhile in Elizabeth, New Jersey be-
longed to the branch of the Order of St. Benedict, which had received a
charter of incorporation from the State of New Jersey, and which was
the branch suing Albert Steinhauser to whom Father Wirth had appar-
ently devised his royalties in certain copyrights. The Order maintained
that since Father Wirth had taken a vow of poverty, his property was not
his to dispose of as he wished.
107 The dissent in Schuster v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986), did this
successfully.
108 234 U.S. 640.
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Chief Justice Hughes agreed with the order. He concluded that
under the state charter, the Order did have a prior claim on the royalties.
He held that Father Wirth's property belonged to the corporation to
which he had taken a vow of poverty, because he had taken that vow in
accordance with the state charter, and because neither Father Wirth nor
the corporation had ever severed the relationship which gave rise to the
vow of poverty.109 In other words, as an agent of the corporation for
whom he had taken a vow of poverty, Father Wirth held property for the
benefit of the corporation. Normally, however, agents do not hold their
own personal income for a principal. Thus, Justice Hughes argued that
the Order had not infringed Father Wirth's civil rights by putting him in
a position of "complete servitude" for the Order or by denying him the
right to "acquire and hold property," since Father Wirth could leave at
any time according to the constitution of the Order.110
At first glance, the case appears as a simple issue of following a
corporation's state charter. But this case is actually an indication of the
problems that could arise under Justice Blackmun's approach described
in Jones. Justice Hughes does rely on a secular document to make his
determination, but he also turns to the constitution of the Order as well as
the Rule of St. Benedict to understand the charter, and in doing so, he
subordinates the religious law to the secular law:
It [respondent's argument of denial of civil rights] over-
looks the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical
rights and duties; between the Order of St. Benedict of
New Jersey, a corporation of the State, and the monastic
brotherhood subject to church authority; between the ob-
ligation imposed by the corporate organization and the
religious vows. As we have said, the question here is
not one of canon law or ecclesiastical polity. The re-
quirement of complainant's constitution must be read ac-
cording to its terms and validity must be thus
determined. Granted that it is to be examined in the light
of that to which it refers, still, obligations which are in-
consistent with its express provisions cannot be imported
into it. Granted that it is to be examined in the light of
that to which it refers, still, obligations which are incon-
sistent with its express provisions cannot be imported
into it.1
109 Id. at 647.
110 Id. at 647-48.
111 Id. at 648.
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Justice Hughes relies on secular legal documents to make his determina-
tion. However, he finds that he must turn to the Rule and the constitution
in order to define what the legal terms are supposed to mean. The Rule
and the constitution give a meaning to the charter which corporations do
not usually have. Although one could argue that Justice Hughes merely
uses the ecclesiastical constitution and the Rule as evidence, as Justice
Powell recommended sixty-five years later, what Justice Hughes actually
did was to subordinate the religious law to its civil legal expression. Ad-
ditionally, Justice Hughes refers to the Rule in order to argue that,
although Father Wirth may appear to have had free use of his own prop-
erty (in contradiction of his vow of poverty) Father Wirth's permission
for the use of the money was limited to charitable purposes, and thus
suitable for the purposes of the principal.
Examining Father Wirth's position from the perspective of his day
to day relationship with the Order provides a superior method of dealing
with questions like this one. One could argue that contrary to Justice
Hughes' argument, Father Wirth's devising of the income from his copy-
rights to a person outside the Order of St. Benedict indicates that Father
Wirth viewed the money as his own and not the Order's. This method of
looking at the secular realities divorced from religious law would allow
courts to avoid pretending that they are not intruding on religious law,
when in fact they are actually using it to arrive at a determination of a
legal relationship. Thus, courts could look at a religious body's actual
relationship with its "agent," rather than the relationship as defined by
religious law. In this case, the Order probably would have lost its case
against Steinhauser, since Wirth clearly believed that the Order was not
granting him the use of his income for charitable purposes, but as his
own personal property, which he could devise to Steinhauser.
Religious freedom in general would be more secure under this ap-
proach, as religions would not be subject to the interference of courts
interpreting their religious laws. Under Justice Powell's approach the
Court could recognize as a fact that Father Wirth had agreed to give all
of his property to the Order, but the Court would not be able to interpret
the legal meaning of the agreement by reference to religious law. 12 This
case would not, however, allow for deference to the hierarchical author-
ity of the religious body, as this was not an intrachurch property dispute.
112 Justice Powell's approach is essentially an affirmation of Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679 (1871). Watson states that "When a civil right depends upon an ecclesiastical
matter, it is the civil court and not the ecclesiastical which is to decide. But the civil tribunal
tries the civil right and no more, taking the ecclesiastical decisions out of which the civil right
arises, as it finds them." 13 Wall. at 731. Here the Watson court was actually quoting Harmon
v. Dreher, 17 S. C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (1843), a South Carolina case. Nevertheless, this
statement contradicts Justice Hughes' reliance on ecclesiastical law.
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The issues of the civil legal effect of vows of poverty and the agent-
principal relationship between a religious order and its members arose
again in 1986 in Fogarty v. United States113 and in Schuster v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue.114 Although I will discuss Fogarty first,
since the Schuster court cited Fogarty as precedent, the dissent in
Schuster employs a desirable method concentrating on day-to-day reali-
ties for ascertaining the validity of a vow of poverty. The cases have
largely identical fact patterns. Before Father Gerald Fogarty, a member
of the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), began teaching in the Department of
Religious Studies at the University of Virginia in 1977, he sought and
received permission from the provincial head of his Order to teach at the
state school. Like Father Wirth, Father Fogarty had taken vows of pov-
erty, chastity, and obedience to his Order, and he, thus, required the per-
mission of his Order in order to accept the position. As Fogarty's vow of
poverty prevented him from owning any property, he and the Order
opened a joint checking account into which Fogarty deposited his Uni-
versity of Virginia paychecks which he signed over to the Order. In turn,
the Order provided him with living expenses. Fogarty paid no federal
income tax on this income, as he and the Order believed the income was
not taxable based on the IRS's previous practices, and based on a letter
from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the U.S. Catholic
Conference.
Fogarty's lawyer's brief referred to the IRS's "60-year administra-
tive practice," first codified in O.D. 119, 1 C.B. 82 (1919), and rein-
forced in Rev. Rul. 68-123, 1968-1 C.B. 35.115 The brief quoted from
O.D. 119: "Members of religious orders are subject to tax upon taxable
income, if any, received by them individually, but are not subject to tax
on income received by them merely as agents of the order of which they
are members."'116 The brief then noted that the 1968 Revenue Ruling
made similar provisions. 117 An amicus brief from Fathers Valens J.
Waldschmidt and Jerome G. Kircher, who were plaintiffs in similar ac-
tions then pending in the United State Claims Court, noted that the IRS
113 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
114 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986). See also, Bridget R. O'Neil, Note, Schuster v. Commis-
sioner: An Appropriate Agency Test for Members of Religious Orders Working Under Vows of
Poverty? 1988 Wis. L. REv. 111 (1988), and Francine M. Corcoran, Comment, Seventh Cir-
cuit's Taxation of Members of Religious Orders-A Change of Habit, 31 CATH. LAW. 62
(1987).
115 Brief for Father Gerald P. Fogarty at 16, Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1218).
116 Id. (emphasis in quotation in brief, but not in O.D. 119.) Sister Francine Schuster's
lawyers cited an identical statement from Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 (C.B.) 26. See O'Neil,
supra note 114, at 111 n.3. Of course, the question for the Federal Circuit in Fogarty and the
Seventh Circuit in Schuster is whether an agency relationship actually exists.
117 Brief for Fogarty, supra note 115, at 16.
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had provided the U.S. Catholic Conference with a letter affirming the
continued vitality of O.D. 119.118 However, by the late 1970s the IRS
had different concerns than it had when it passed and later sustained
these ruling. Tax protesters had begun taking false vows of poverty,
turning their earnings over to their churches, and then receiving the
equivalent amount in return, under conditions which they believed would
render their income untaxable. These tax protesters were generally easy
to spot, as they filed income tax forms claiming they had no taxable
income, and containing tax protester comments.119 Essentially, the IRS
decided to end a longstanding legitimate practice in order to combat all
false attempts to avoid tax by a claim of a vow of poverty to a religious
body. The Federal Circuit concluded that the best means of deciding any
case involving taxability of income under a vow of poverty requires that
the Court examine the agent-principal relationship between alleged agent
and the alleged principal.1 20 The Court maintained, however, that it
could not use canon law to reach this determination, as canon law has no
civil legal effect in defining the agent-principal relationship:
A careful reading of Poe indicates to us that the division
of income and the agency relationship of the wage-earn-
ing spouse depended on the operation of state commu-
nity property law. Appellant does not contend that the
ownership rights involved between the Jesuit Order and
its members are given effect by the operation of law.
Rather we are told that the religious order's ownership
rights, arising from the member's legal relationship with
the Order, which is defined by the member's vows and is
established by canon law of the Catholic Church, are
given effect in civil courts. Although such a right may
be established in law, an enforceable civil right arising
118 Brief for Amicus Curiae, Fogarty v. United States, 780 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(No. 85-1218) at 5 and Appendix A.
119 O'Neil, supra note 114, at 116 n.46, cites the following tax protester cases: McGahen
v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 468 (1981); Page v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351 (1986);
Speakman v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 939 (1986); Long v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M.
(CCH) 23 (1985); Noberini v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 587 (1983).
Fogarty's lawyers referred to the IRS's interest in combatting tax fraud by tax protesters,
as the lawyers noted that "Father Fogarty is not a tax protester involved with a scheme to avoid
taxes and is easily distinguishable from tax protester cases." Brief for Fogarty, supra note 115,
at 36 et seq. Fogarty's brief also noted that the tax court below asserted that the tax protester
problem "has come to concern us more ... not because of anything the Jesuits have done, but
because many other people have started to claim religious exemptions. There are a floodgate
of such cases. And Father Fogarty happened to be among those cases that were made the
subject of examination" (Emphasis supplied in brief.) Quoted in id. at note 20.
120 However, the Court also claimed falsely that it was not overriding O.D. 119. It is
impossible to see how it was not.
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from church law is not the same as a right or legal rela-
tionship which is created by operation of state law. 121
Hence, despite Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, which the Court
cites, the Court concludes that the canon law relationship expressed in
vows of poverty is not "an enforceable legal right." Although the
Court's holding that Fogarty wrongly withheld federal income tax pay-
ments was unfair to members of religious orders, as it overturned state-
ments of the IRS upon which religious orders had relied since 1919, the
Court treated canon law correctly.
Contrary to Fogarty's brief, which refers to canons 487 to 681, ca-
non law does not "establish a legal relationship between an individual
member of a religious order and the order."12 2 It establishes a canonical
relationship, not a secular legal relationship. Moreover, for a court to
interpret canon law in order to determine whether it creates an agency
relationship would be an impermissible intrusion on the free exercise of
religion, as it would involve a court telling a religion what its doctrine
means. Still, the Fogarty court could have examined the day to day real-
ities of Father Fogarty's relation with the Jesuits in order to determine
whether Fogarty in fact was living a legally cognizable vow of poverty,
distinguishable from the sham vows of poverty of tax protesters. In de-
termining whether Fogarty was living a legitimate vow of poverty, the
court could have accepted into its factfinding the constitution of the
Jesuits, and the Jesuits' decrees on the vow of poverty, 123 evidence about
the arrangements between the Jesuits and Fogarty, the history of the
Jesuits and their vow of poverty dating back to the Counter-Reformation
in the sixteenth century, and the fact of the Jesuits' incorporation in
America in the eighteenth century as the Corporation of Roman Catholic
Clergymen. All of this evidence should allow a court to determine the
validity of Fogarty's claim to an exclusion from income tax as a result of
a legitimate vow of poverty. 124
121 780 F.2d at 1009.
122 Brief for Fogarty, supra note 115, at 3 et seq. The brief refers to the 1917 Code of
Canon Law. Revisions in 1983 have changed the numbering of the canons.
Mark Chopko, General Counsel for the U.S. Catholic Conference, informed me in a letter
dated 14 February 1996 that he knows "of no religious community that intends a Vow of
Poverty to have a civil legal effect. They are also not held to be civil contract under
consideration."
123 Brief for Fogarty, supra note 115, at 4-5.
124 Unfortunately, however, it might still be difficult for courts under such a system to
draw a distinction between legitimate vows of poverty and sham vows, since all that U.S. v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), would require from a person claiming a religious right is a sin-
cerely held belief. Surely, the tax protesters hold their beliefs in the wrongness of the income
tax, as sincerely as Fogarty holds his belief in Catholicism. This difficulty, though, is not
enough to overcome the fact that judicial interpretation of religious law constitutes an interfer-
ence with the free exercise of religion.
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Schuster v. Commissioner'25 resembled Fogarty. Sister Francine
Schuster, who had taken vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience to her
order of nuns, received in 1979 an offer from U.S. Public Health Service
to work in a clinic in an impoverished area.1 26 Her order accepted the
offer for her, and in its letter of acceptance, the order made clear that
Sister Schuster's checks should go to her order, rather than to her.127
The Seventh Circuit purported to follow a test which the Federal Circuit
used in its Fogarty decision, and held that Sister Schuster did owe taxes
on her income, even though the income actually went to the order. 128
Judge Cudahy in his dissent in Schuster, however, worked out a
much more reliable means for determining whether Sister Schuster, Fa-
ther Fogarty, or anyone else in their positions would owe federal income
fax. The dissent found a workable means for evaluating the actual
cirmcumstances of Sister Francine Schuster's employment outside of her
Order in order to determine the validity of her actions as an agent for her
Order.129 The test has three parts. First, the court would examine the
extent of control which the Order has over the member: "[T]he question
of the principal's right to direct or control the agent's activities in a
meaningful way would be central. Here there is no question about the
vow of obedience and the right to control. This very sweeping basis of
control creates an agency relationship now .... "130 Under this portion
of the test, Judge Cudahy recognizes the significance of the Order's re-
quirement that Schuster receive her Order's permission to work outside
125 800 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1986).
126 Id. at 674.
127 Id. at 675.
128 Id. at 677.
129 O'Neil, supra note 114, also favors the test in Judge Cudahy's dissent. Unlike the
majority's test, Cudahy's does not make almost any case of a member of a religious order
working outside the order per se impossible as an agency relationship. Id. at 136-38. The
dissent's test is largely a response to the majority's application of what it called the Fogarty
test. For example, the majority did examine questions such as the amount of control the prin-
cipal has over the agent, but did not use the dissent's day-to-day realities test in applying the
test. Nevertheless, the Fogarty court did not create a test:
There is no fixed way to approach the issue. The presence of unique facts in each
case will inevitably lead the court to place more emphasis on one or more factors
and less on others. The relationship between the order and the member gives rise to
a number of factors. Relevant considerations there will include the degree of control
exercised by the order over the member as well as the ownership rights between the
member and the order,... the purposes or mission of the order, and the type of work
performed by the member vis-a-vis those purposes or mission....
Other factors will include the dealings between the member and the third-party em-
ployer ... and dealings between the employer and order.
780 F.2d at 1012. Thus, the court did not mean these suggestions of relevant factors to create
a rigid test, such as the one the majority used in Schuster.
130 800 F.2d at 682 (Cudahy, J., dissenting.)
200 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:171
the Order, and that the Order required Schuster not "to perform work that
conflicts with a moral precept observed by the Order."'131
Second, relying on Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser, Cudahy
argues that the fact that the principal has "the right to claim and take
possession of the compensation earned by the agent without question and
without the possibility of any effective adverse claim"'132 further indi-
cates that Schuster really has no control over the income. Cudahy's reli-
ance on Order of St. Benedict is problematic. Using a day-to-day
realities test, one could argue instead that the fact that the member of the
religious order does in fact turn over her income to her order, and re-
ceives in return a stipend should further indicate an agency relation-
ship. 133 Third, Cudahy asks "whether the services performed are of a
type within the mission or purpose of the alleged principal." 134 The
traditional mission of Schuster's orders was to provide health care, and
Schuster worked as a nurse-midwife. Additionally, the traditional mis-
sion of the Jesuits is teaching, and Fogarty taught at the University of
Virginia. Hence, Judge Cudahy has demonstrated the possibility of re-
specting the structures of religious organizations without infringing on
their free exercise by interpreting their religious law.
The most egregious case in which a court has ignored a religion's
interpretation of its own law occurred in Stevens v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Fresno. 135 The question of the agency relationship between a
priest and his bishop arose in this case in order to determine whether the
Bishop of Fresno was vicariously liable for a priest's car accident. The
priest was a missionary from the Basque region of France who was min-
istering to Basque immigrants in California. After visting a Basque fam-
ily in October 1970, the priest hit and killed two men driving in another
car. In determining whether an agency relationship existed between the
priest and the Bishop of Fresno, the California Court of Appeals not only
concluded that it could interpret canon law, it concluded that it could
hear and accept testimony that the diocese's own canon law expert was
not interpreting canon law correctly. Thus, the Court accepted the testi-
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 This would not weed out the tax protester cases as easily as the first and third prongs
of the test. The tax protesters generally went about their lives as they normally would have
with the exception that they turned over their income to their churches. One could reach them
under this prong of the test, though, by recognizing that unlike Fogarty and Schuster, the tax
protesters did not receive a stipend; they received their entire salaries back from the churches.
134 800 F.2d at 683.
135 49 Cal. App. 3d 877 (1975). Chopko, supra note 11, at 305, recognizes that judicial
scrutiny of religious documents may lead to excessive entanglement. But he attests that reli-
gious bodies usually invite such scrutiny in tort cases, in order to prove lack of liability.
Whether a religious entity invites scrutiny or not, judicial interpretation of a religious docu-
ment is an infringement of free exercise.
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mony of Dr. John Noonan, an expert witness, that an agency relationship
did exist between the priest and the bishop under canon law, to such an
extent that under Noonan's analysis of canon law, a priest acts for his
bishop in virtually all of his daily activities. 136
The court did recognize that "[t]he significant test of an agency rela-
tionship is the principal's right to control the activities of the agent," 137
but it concluded that the day-to-day realities of the relationship between
the priest and the bishop Would not provide adequate evidence of an
agency relationship, since whether the bishop exercises the relationship
or not, it still exists. Nevertheless, the Restatement (Second) of Agency
does not require the abstraction from daily life that the Court of Appeals
requires. The Comment on subsection 1 of § 1 Restatement states that
The relation of agency is created as a result of conduct
by two parties manifesting that one of them is willing for
the other to act for him subject to his control, and that
the other consents so to act. The principal must in some
manner indicate that the agent is to act for him, and the
agent must act or agree to act on the principal's behalf
and subject to his control. 138
Additionally, Chopko in an article on "ascending liability" 139 in cases
involving religious entities, provides a simple test for liability:
First, the court must find that the person who committed
the tort was the agent, employee, or servant in a relation-
ship with the religious organization. Second, the court
must find that the activity was within the scope of duties
the person was to perform, or that the activity was a
foreseeable consequence of that person's normal activi-
ties in the task.' 40
136 49 Cal. App. 3d at 881-82.
137 Id. at 884.
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) cmt. a, (1957).
139 Chopko, supra note 11, at 290, indicates that the terms "ascending liability" has "not
appear[ed] in any reported decision," but that the terms gained popularity ten or fifteen years
ago in order to describe the reasoning the California courts used in Barr v. United Methodist
Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979). In Barr, the court asserted
jurisdiction over an "unincorporated community of believers, their churches, and agencies, to
answer for the failure of separately incorporated Methodist retirment homes in California.'
See also Chopko at 292-99. However, commentators have not restricted the term to cases of
respondeat superior involving unincorporated entities. His definition essentially applies the
term "ascending liability" to cases of vicarious liability involving non-commercial entities.
Chopko also notes that the concept of charitable immunity is essentially dead. Id. at 289 n.1.
140 Id. at 311.
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Thus, reference to the actual conduct of the parties can provide a worka-
ble and less complex means of determining the existence of an agency
relationship.
No courts in California or anywhere else have followed the Stevens
court in second guessing the Catholic church's own interpretation of
whether its own canon law creates an agency relationship. 141 However,
two courts, one in Kansas and one in Nebraska, have confronted the
same question of ascending liability, and they have concluded that canon
law does not provide an appropriate means for determining an agency
relationship. Dr. Noonan provided an affidavit as an expert witness in
canon law in Ambrosio v. Price,142 a diversity action against a priest
involved in a car accident. Here too, Noonan argued that canon law cre-
ated an agency relationship. However, the court asserted that Noonan's
definition of agency under canon law exceeded the definition of an
agency relationship under Nebraska law:
[T]he implications of his interpretation are that all of a
priest's associations with those Catholics if not all per-
sons who reside in his diocese are on behalf of the
Bishop. That is, a priest's associations with other
Catholics within his diocese are all, by necessity and due
to his priestly obligations, business. The law of agency
in Nebraska does not reach this far.1" 3
Instead the court concentrated on the actual circumstances concerning
the purpose of the trip, and concluded without reference to canon law
that the priest was not engaged in his employment when he visited a
Catholic family."14
Similarly in Brillhart v. Scheier,145 another case of a priest's car
accident, the Kansas court asserted that the Stevens court's use of canon
law was inapplicable, since a decision based on canon law is contrary to
Kansas law.146 Unlike Ambrosio, though, the priest in Brillhart was en-
gaged in an activity which could benefit the diocese. Thus, the court
conceded that the priest was acting for the diocese, but it asked whether
he was acting in a master-servant relationship or whether he was an in-
dependent contractor. It concluded that he was an independent contrac-
tor. The court concentrated on the manner in which a priest and a bishop
141 Chopko, supra note 11, at 314 n.l12, asserts that "California courts from the same
judicial district have similarly not adopted this broad agency theory. E.g., Marco C. v. Roman
Catholic Bishop of Fresno, 5 Civ. No. F3610 (Cal. Ct. App. filed March 29, 1985) (sexual
assault)."
142 495 F. Supp. 381 (1979).
143 Id. at 385.
144 Id. at 384.
145 758 P.2d 219 (Kan. 1988).
146 Id. at 223.
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actually conduct their affairs. The court's only reference to canon law
appeared in a paragraph detailing the myriad ways in which a priest actu-
ally has control over his own affairs:
The bishop is clearly the pastor's superior under ecclesi-
astical law. The evidence shows, however, that a pas-
tor's day-to-day activities are within his own discretion
and control. He is authorized under Canon Law to do
whatever he feels is necessary to carry out his duties. He
sets his own hours and vacation. He makes out his own
paycheck, and hires or fires any non-priest/non-deacon
employee, such as secretaries and janitors. Such sala-
ries, including his own, come from parish receipts. The
pastor has complete discretion in purchasing church sup-
plies and paying the bills from parish funds. The details
of daily bookkeeping and accounting of sums received
and spent by the parish are not reviewed by the
diocese. 147
The court recognized that canon law did provide a definition for the rela-
tionship, but it concentrated on how the priest explicitly conducted his
affairs. Using the "right to control" test to determine whether this evi-
dence suggested an agency relationship, the court concluded that it did
not, since "the diocese has no control over the day-to-day activities of a
parish pastor."148 The court remarked further that the priest's car and
insurance were his own; that the diocese did not ask him to make the trip
which led to the accident; and that he never requested permission from
147 Id. at 221.
148 Id. at 223. The court also argued that "if the negligence of the pastor may be imputed
to the diocese, it logically may be extended to the Pope, as all control over the pastor's em-
ployment ultimately stems from Roman Catholic ecclesiastical law, in which the Pope is the
highest authority." IL This, however, is false, to the extent that canon law states that every
bishop is sovereign in his own diocese. See CODE c. 381 § I cmt. Additionally, Chopko,
supra note 11, at 307 n.75 cites Package v. Holy See, No. 86-C-222 (N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 30,
1988), in which plaintiffs sued for a monk's car acccident. But the court concluded that the
Holy See (the ruling body of Vatican City of which the Pope is the head) had inadequate
control to prevent this harm.
Additionally, in Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco v. The Superior Court of
Alameda County, 15 Cal. App. 3d 405 (1971), William Sheffield attempted to sue the Arch-
bishop of San Francisco for a complaint which Sheffield had against an order of monks in
Switzerland. Sheffield depended heavily on canon law to argue that the Archbishop and the
monks were a "'mere shell and naked framework which defendants Roman Catholic Church,
The Bishop of Rome, and the Holy See, have used and do now use as a mere conduit for the
conduit [sic) of their ideas, business, property, and affairs' and that all defendants are 'alter
egos' of each other." For reasons unrelated to canon law, the court ordered the Superior Court
to grant summary judgment to the Archbishop, since Sheffield provided no real evidence that
defendants were alter egos.
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the diocese, "as was in keeping with his autonomous position as
pastor." 149
The dissent disagreed with the majority's dismissal of Stevens, as
well as with the use of the "right to control test." However, Justice
Lockett's dissent, despite his acceptance of Stevens, actually concen-
trated on the day-to-day realities of the priest's life as pastor of a Catho-
lic Church to reach his contrary decision. He also cited Malloy v.
Fong'50 favorably to conclude that the hierarchy of a church does gener-
ally have control over its clergy. He failed to note, however, that the
Presbyterian church in Malloy was not typical of Presbyterian churches
in that it was not fully autonomous. 51 Thus, one cannot simply con-
clude that hierarchies generally do have control over their churches or
clergy.
Cases of sexual abuse have not created similar questions of agency,
since, as Chopko notes:
[I]ntentional torts are not a foreseeable incident of em-
ployment, and therefore the religious organization
should not bear the responsibility. Applying the two
step analysis for respondeat superior, regardless of
whether the person is an agent or an employee, courts
have generally held that deliberate sexual misconduct
(rape or sexual battery) is far outside the scope of ex-
pected duties of the employees, the ministers, or the
volunteers.152
The Washington Supreme Court in John Does v. CompCare et aL,153 is
an exception to Chopko's assertion. The court found that under canon
law, the diocese's relationship with the priest who had sexually abused
minors went beyond a normal employer-employee contract, because of
the duty of obedience which the priest owed to the diocese, and because
the diocese continued to pay living and medical expenses for the priest,
even when he was in Spokane, Washington, well beyond the territorial
range of the diocese. 154 Additionally, it noted that the diocese was aware
of the priest's history of abuse, and thus, that a jury could find the dio-
cese negligent in its supervision of him.' 55 The Court's reference to ca-
149 758 P.2d at 224.
150 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
151 758 P.2d at 225-26. Chopko, supra note 11, at 305-07 discusses Malloy. The Califor-
nia court in Malloy held that the hierarchy of the local presbytery was vicariously liable, be-
cause it had established a number of non-autonomous mission churches in a rapidly growing
area.
152 Chopko, supra note 11, at 317-18.
153 52 Wash. App. 688 (1988).
154 Id. at 695.
155 Id.
CANON LAW
non law here is reasonable, as it only cited canon law for its evidentiary
value, and it relied primarily on the actual circumstances of the relation-
ship between the diocese and the priest to reach its conclusion.' 56
State v. Zimmer 157 involved an unusual twist on the agency and ca-
non law problem. A trespasser at a church in Minnesota sought to have
entered into evidence at his criminal trial all 1,752 canons in the Code of
Canon Law. He contended that the priest who had received a restraining
order against him did not really have control over the church property;
rather the bishop of the diocese did.' 58 The court held that "any potential
probative value of the Code was clearly outweighed by the prejudice and
confusion which would have ensued."'159 The court -also cited Jones
when it addressed the problem of the admissibility of canon law:
Defendant apparently intended to call the jury's attention
to certain canons of his own selection, which would have
required the jurors to interpret isolated provisions out of
context and without any understanding of how they
might interact with other canons. Also many of the ca-
nons reflect church doctrine, which would be an invita-
tion to the jurors to go beyond the 'neutral principles of
law' analysis to which civil courts are limited, Jones v.
Wolf... 160
This use of Jones demonstrates its ambiguities. Despite the Minnesota
court's reference to Jones, the Jones majority would probably condone
the use of canon law in this case, as long as canon law only served to
resolve the secular question of ownership of church property. The Min-
nesota court further confused the matter when it held that, if as in Ste-
vens, the defendant had brought in an expert to interpret canon law, the
evidence "might have been admissible."'16 Such a conclusion contra-
dicts the assertion that admission of canon law would violate the neutral
principles of law.
Justice Yetka in dissent recognized the majority's misrepresentation
of Jones, but argued that the Code could be admissible to show whether
156 In another case, Rita M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 187 Cal. App.
3d 1453, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1986), the Court of Appeals held that the bishop could not be
held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, because sexual assault is outside the
employment duties of a priest.
157 487 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1992).
158 The priest would be an agent in this case, as he would only be holding the property for
the principal, the bishop.
159 487 N.W.2d at 888.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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the defendant "had a good faith belief based on the canons, that he had a
claim of right [as a parishioner] to be on the property." 162
If the purpose of entering the canon law into evidence was to show
the defendant's state of mind, that evidence would be admissible, since it
would not involve an interpretation of canon law. However, the addition
of expert testimony would certainly not eliminate the problem of al-
lowing a jury to decide the meaning of canon law. Instead of framing the
issue as a question whether to admit canon law or not, the court could
simply have looked at civil evidence to determine the truth or falsity of
the pastor's assertion that he was the "lawful possessor." The most obvi-
ous form of this evidence would be the articles of incorporation for the
diocese, and the deed to the church. Neither party sought to have such
evidence admitted. 163
The final area of discussion of judicial interpretation of canon law
provisions concerns interpretation of religious antenuptial agreements.
In 1932 the Holy Office, a part of the Vatican, promulgated regulations
for the marriage of Catholics with non-Catholics. 164 Although the
Church had opposed unions outside the Church since the early years of
Christianity, and although it had had a policy regarding such marriages
prior to 1932, it reaffirmed its position on these marriages in 1932. The
regulations required that when a Catholic and a non-Catholic marry in
the Catholic Church, the non-Catholic must agree to raise their children
Catholic. Writing in the Jesuit weekly, AMERICA, in April 1932, William
I. Longeran asserted:
As for the promises to educate children Catholics, this
implies not only that they will be baptized, be taught
their prayers, be brought up to attend Mass, be prepared
for Confession, Communion, and Confirmation and, in
general, learn the rudiments of religion, but that they
will be so grounded in their Faith and its practices that it
may be anticipated that they will continue steadfast. 165
Longeran states further that canon law requires that in order for the mar-
riage to be valid under canon law, the priest must have a "moral cer-
tainty" that the parties intend to abide by the agreement. He contends,
though, that failure to abide by the agreement would not render an other-
162 Id. at 890.
163 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.15 and 315.16 (West 1996) concern incorporation of reli-
gious associations. According to Legal Department of the NCWC 1954 Supp., supra note 34,
at 32, these statutes existed in 1954.
164 William 1. Lonergan, Church Laws on Mixed Marriages, 47 AMERICA 59 (1932). The
Holy Office's action apparently followed from Pius Xl's promulgation of the 1930 encyclical
on marriage, Castii Connubii.
165 Id. at 60.
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wise valid marriage invalid, "[n]or does it obligate those granting dispen-
sations [for the marriage to the non-Catholic] to make the promises
legally enforceable, a procedure of very doubtful validity in a country
like ours and that might well serve as a boomerang."'166
Nevetherless, in Ramon v. Ramon 67 the New York State Domestic
Relations Court held that such an agreement was a legally enforceable
contract. It based its holding on several considerations, among them ca-
non law. The court noted that the Roman Catholic father had relied on
this promise, and had as a result irrevocably changed his status in mar-
riage as a result of the promise; the court placed "paramount" importance
on the religious upbringing of the child; it asserted that § 88 of the Do-
mestic Relations Court Act required it to approve the request of the Cath-
olic parent that the child be raised Catholic; it contended that
enforcement of the agreement was "a matter of sound public policy;"'168
and it asserted that "the Court will take judicial notice that the Roman
Catholic Church is the only church whose members are bound by its laws
even to the penalty of excommunication of the party who permits non-
Catholic training and education of their children."' 169 This last aspect is
what provides the court with its reason for discussing canon law.
The court begins its discussion of canon law by remarking that ca-
non law antedates even the common law; and by noting that since the
days of Biblical Judaism and the early Christian church, Judaism and
Christianity have considered marrying outside the faith a grave prob-
lem.170 The court quotes from the Books of Genesis, Deuteronomy,
Ezra, Nehemiah, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and Corinthians to advance its
position. It also discusses the Council of Elvira of 305 A.D. Addition-
ally, the court quotes from Pope Pius X's 1930 encyclical on marriage,
Casti Connubii:
'Everywhere and with the greatest strictness the Church
forbids marriage between baptized persons one of whom
is a Catholic and the other a member of a schismatical or
heretical sect ,' declared the Pontiff, 'And if there is ad-
ded to this, the danger of falling away of the Catholic
party and the [religious] perversion of the children, such
a marriage is forbidden also by Divine Law.' Encyclical
Pope Pius XI, on Christian Marriage; 62 Cod. Jur. Can.
c. 1060.
166 Id. at 61.
167 34 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
168 Id. at 107.
169 1 at 113.
170 Id. at 108-09.
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This dogma enters into the very essence of the antenup-
tial agreement, for the reason that a Catholic ceremonial
marriage binds the Catholic party for life. Matthew
XIX, 6; Corinthians VII, 10-27; Mark X, 9; Catholic En-
cyclopedia-Marriage; Canon Law. 171
While all of this indicates a religion's interest in raising children in that
religion, it does not prove a legal obligation to enforce an antenuptial
agreement. Courts act wrongly when they interpret a religion's doctrine,
whether the intepretation favors the religion or not. The court's asser-
tions create a strong suspicion of an establishment of religion, by holding
that religious doctrine has legal force in the state.
Ramon v. Ramon was not the last case in New York State to hold
that a religious antenuptial agreement is legally enforceable. The New
York courts represent an exception among the states in being willing to
enforce these agreements, not only for Catholics, but also for Orthodox
Jews, and agnostics. 172 However, the New York courts do not enforce
these agreements consistently. 173 Although these decisions may give
comfort to the religious (and even the non-religious 74), they constitute
an establishment of religion, and they threaten to intrude on the free ex-
ercise of religion by giving a government sanctioned meaning to reli-
gious doctrine.
CONCLUSION
This note has argued for a consistent deference to religious law in
the courts. Aside from the legal constraints which the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses place on judicial interference with religion, courts
should avoid interpreting canon law in order to accord religions respect
as distinctive and valuable social institutions; and in order to recognize
the sovereignty of religious bodies. Courts should also recognize that
they lack the competence to interpret a body of law based on revelation.
Additionally, although the Supreme Court's position on judicial interpre-
tation of church law remains clouded as a result of the Jones decision,
lower courts which review the history of the Supreme Court's encounters
with canon law will recognize that the Court has advocated staying away
from church law interpretation as much as possible.
171 Id. at 109-10.
172 Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971 §16
(1983 & Supp.). See also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108 (1983) (an Orthodox Jewish
antenuptial agreement that the husband would appear before a religious tribunal in the event of
marital difficulties is legally binding).
173 22 A.L.R.4th 971 §16a.
174 See Spring v. Glawon, 89 A.D.2d 980 (2d Dept. 1982) (mother must conform to
agreement with father that the child will have no religious upbringing).
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Courts which recognize the importance of avoiding canon law inter-
pretations will look for an alternative source for an understanding of the
religion's civil legal position, for example a contract with another party,
or the diocese's articles of incorporation. Barring such evidence,
factfinders should explore the actual day-to-day conduct of the religious
party, rather than turning to religious law to provide meaning for these
activities. An understanding of canon law requires a profound under-
standing of Catholic tradition and scripture, which few courts or juries
have. Interpreting canon law without this background will likely lead to
a misunderstanding of canon law.
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